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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78A-3-102(3)(j) as 
this matter is a direct appeal from a final judgment of the Seventh District Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court correctly conclude that Marion/SITLA are not authorized, under 
the plain language of the condemnation statute, to take KFJ's private property to 
construct permanent roads across KFJ's land to access oil and gas wells they propose to 
place on their SITLA mineral leases (i) when the plain language of the condemnation 
statute shows the legislature expressly conferred authority to take private property for 
pipelines, tanks and reservoirs in connection with oil and gas, but omitted any reference 
to oil and gas when conferring authority to take land for roads, and (ii) when the 
legislative history of the condemnation statute shows that in spite of numerous revisions 
to the statute, the legislature did not add "oil and gas" to the provision relating to roads, 
and that introduction of a bill to amend the statute to specifically include "oil and gas" 
relating to roads was not adopted? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss based on its interpretation of a statute is 
a question of law, which the trial court reviews for correctness. Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 
2007 UT 77, lj 6, 169P.3d441. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-501(6)(a): Subject to the provisions of this part, the 
right of eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public uses: 
(6) (a) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, 
and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other 
reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or 
mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-6-501(6)(d): 
(d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any 
subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground 
storage of natural gas, and in connection with that, any other 
interests in property which may be required to adequately examine, 
prepare, maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage 
facilities; 
Utah Code Ann. Section 40-8-4(6)(b): "Deposit" or "mineral deposit" excludes sand, 
gravel, rock aggregate, water, geothermal steam, and oil and gas as defined in Title 40, 
Chapter 6, Board and Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, but includes oil shale and 
bituminous sands extracted by mining operations. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 40-8-4(14)(b): "Mining operation" does not include: 
(ii) the extraction of oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6, Board and 
Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
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Utah Code Ann, Section 53C-1-103(4): As used in this title: 
(4) "Mineral" includes oil, gas, and hydrocarbons. 
V, STATEMENT OF CASE 
The KFJ Ranch Partnership ("KFJ") is the owner of the KFJ Ranch, which is 
located in the Nine Mile Canyon area near Price, Utah. (R.00002, f 4) The ranch 
consists of approximately 6,600 acres of property owned in fee simple, 1,500 acres that 
are leased from the state government, and 1,300 acres that are leased from the federal 
government. (R.000224, 3 (second page 3)) 
Marion Energy, Inc. ("Marion") is the holder of two state oil and gas leases, some 
of which underlie the KFJ Ranch. (R.00003, % 10) Marion intends to place two oil wells 
on the KFJ Ranch property and is attempting to take KFJ's private property to construct 
permanent roads to access these proposed wells, including transporting oil and gas from 
those wells by road unless and until Marion decides to construct a pipeline for such 
purpose. (R. 00005, fflf 13-14) 
The land Marion/SITLA wants to take is a thirty-foot strip over an existing dirt 
road built by KFJ on its property (the "access road"), and another thirty-foot strip over a 
currently existing cow path (the "Pole Canyon road5'). (R.00005, [^14) The proposed 
access road is four miles long and involves a permanent taking of nearly 15 acres of 
KFJ's private property. (R.000224, 15) It would run from the Nine Mile Canyon road to 
one proposed well site and then run past that well site to the border of the KFJ Ranch 
property, where Marion holds another state mineral lease. (R.000224, 15 & 81-85) The 
proposed Pole Canyon road is 1.81 miles long, running from the Nine Mile Canyon road 
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to the other proposed well site, and involves a permanent taking of approximately six and 
a half acres. (R.000224, 15) Marion would use the roads for trucking people and 
products to and from the proposed wells. (R.00005, Tfl|13-14) If the wells prove 
productive, Marion may, at a later date, build a pipeline. (R.00005, ^13) Until such time, 
all access to drill and work the wells and to remove any product from the wells would be 
by the proposed roads. (R.00005, fflfl3-14) BCFJ's counsel has prepared a demonstrative 
map to illustrate the parties' various ownership interests.1 (R.000092) 
Because the SITLA statute grants a lease holder only the limited right to enter 
upon the land on which SITLA owns the mineral rights, and not any right of access over 
private land on which SITLA does not own the mineral rights, see Utah Code Ann. 
section 53C-2-401 et seq., Marion offered KFJ some minimal compensation for the rights 
to construct permanent roads over KFJ's property. (R.000020-R.000023) KFJ, not 
wanting the disturbance and impact this would cause to its land, refused Marion's offer. 
Marion, together with SITLA, then initiated a Complaint in condemnation in the Seventh 
District Court, seeking to take the land under Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation 
statute.2 (R.00001-R.000070) 
On the basis that the condemnation statute does not confer authority to take private 
land for roads to work oil and gas leases, KFJ responded by bringing a motion to dismiss. 
(R.000073—R.000113) Marion/SITLA opposed the motion and also brought a motion 
for summary judgment seeking entry of judgment in the event they were successful in 
1
 The map was created by counsel for illustrative purposes only. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) (West 2009) 
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opposing the motion to dismiss. (R.000119—000150) KFJ opposed the motion for 
summary judgment and brought a Rule 56(f) motion requesting that, in the event its 
motion to dismiss is denied, it be given the opportunity to conduct discovery before a 
decision on Marion/SITLA's motion for summary judgment is rendered. (R.000167— 
R.000190) 
The trial court considered the language of the condemnation statute and found 
Marion/SITLA did not have authority under Subsection 501(6)(a) to take KFJ's land for 
their proposed roads. (R.000225, 23-25) The trial court, noting that as a taking of private 
property the statute should be strictly construed, correctly recognized that the 
legislature's use of the terms oil and gas in its grant of power under Subsection 501(6)(d) 
of the condemnation statute, and the absence of those terms in its grant of power under 
Subsection 501(6)(a), clearly indicated that the legislature did not intend to include oil 
and gas within the term "mineral deposits" under Subsection 501(6)(a). (R.000225, 23-
24) Having granted KFJ's motion to dismiss, the trial court denied Marion/SITLA5 s 
motion for summary judgment, thereby rendering KFJ's Rule 56(f) motion moot. (R. 
000225, 24-25) Marion/SITLA brings this appeal claiming the trial court's decision was 
in error. Concurrent with the filing of Marion/STILA's brief, the Utah Petroleum 
Association ("UPA") requested leave to file an amicus brief, which leave was granted. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The exercise of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual 
ownership in property, must derive from legislative grant that is given in clear, express 
terms or by necessary implication. Private corporations, like state agencies, have no 
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inherent power of eminent domain, and their authority must derive from the highest and 
clearest of legislation. The legislature's grant of the eminent domain power must be 
strictly construed. The right to exercise the power of eminent domain does not exist 
when made out only by argument or inference. The trial court's conclusion that 
Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation statute (Utah Code Ann. section 78B-6-501 
seq.) does not give Marion/SITLA the authority to take KFJ's land for roads in 
connection with its oil and gas leases was correct and entirely consistent with these 
principles. Private property can only be taken when clearly authorized by statute. 
The plain language of the condemnation statute shows that Subsection 501(6)(a) 
does not confer authority to take private land for roads in connection with oil and gas. In 
Subsection 501(6)(a), the legislature sets out the public uses for which land may be taken 
for roads — those uses do not expressly reference access to oil and gas deposits. Rather, 
the legislature refers to "the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working 
of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits ...." In comparison, in the closely 
associated Subsection 501(6)(d), the legislature specifically dealt with a public use for 
which land may be taken in the context of oil and gas extraction - through oil and gas 
pipelines.3 Thus, the plain language of the eminent domain statute shows the legislature 
specifically dealt with the public purposes for which land can be taken with respect to oil 
and gas, and those uses do not include taking private property for exploration and 
extraction of oil and gas through roads. 
In that context, the legislature also refers to "coal" together with oil and gas, i.e., 
"gas, oil or coal pipelines." When it refers to "coal" in Subsection 501(6)(a), it omits any 
reference to oil and gas. 
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Furthermore, application of standard rules of statutory construction supports the 
trial court's conclusion that the legislature did not intend the term "mineral deposits" 
under Subsection 501(6)(a) to include oil and gas. The trial court properly examined the 
language of the condemnation statute and relied on the presumptions that each term is 
used advisedly and that an omission is presumed purposeful. Based on these 
presumptions, the trial court properly determined that the legislature's omission of oil and 
gas in Subsection 501(6)(a) dealing with roads, while expressly including oil and gas in 
the related Subsection 501(6)(d) dealing with pipelines, indicated a legislative intent not 
to include oil and gas in connection with roads. Moreover, application of the well-
recognized rule of ejusdem generis shows the term "mineral deposits" in Subsection 
501(6)(a) should be interpreted in accordance with the character and meaning of the 
surrounding words, which would limit that term to mineral deposits that are generally 
developed by milling, smelting, and reduction of ore, or the working of mines, quarries 
and coal mines. Oil and gas, however, is not extracted through the mining operations 
referred to in Subsection 501(6)(a). Moreover, the legislature has defined "mining 
operations" in Title 40, Mines and Mining, as not including the extraction of oil and gas. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-4(14)(b)(ii) (West 2004). It simply cannot be said that the 
legislature has clearly intended to include oil and gas in Subsection 501(6)(a) through 
examination of the words surrounding the term "mineral deposits." 
The legislative history of the condemnation statute also supports the conclusion 
that oil and gas are not covered by Subsection 501(6)(a). In the laws of Utah, 1896, the 
legislature originally declared the "mining, milling, smelting or other reduction of ores ... 
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to be for the public use," but the legislature broadened its declaration repeatedly over the 
years. In spite of numerous revisions to the statute, however, the legislature never added 
"oil and gas" to the provision dealing with roads that ultimately became Subsection 
501(6)(a), even though it made the effort to add "oil" and "coal" to the authority to 
condemn for pipelines, and even though it added "coal mines" to the mining language 
relating to roads. Finally, in 1997, Senator Dmitrich introduced a bill in the Senate 
proposing that Subsection 501(6)(a) be amended to specifically include oil and gas 
deposits within the definition of "mineral deposits," but the bill was not enacted. 
Moreover, the trial court's finding that Marion/SITLA does not have authority 
under the condemnation statute to take KFJ's private land is not an unfair or unexpected 
result. As an experienced lessee of mineral rights, Marion should be well aware that 
courts do not allow federal lease holders rights of access across private land, and should 
be familiar with the necessity of negotiating with private land owners to ensure access to 
their leases; it is not unfair or unexpected to require Marion to do the same with respect 
to its state leases. Moreover, it is absolutely clear from the amicus briefing of the UPA 
that what the petroleum industry is seeking through this lawsuit and appeal is for this 
Court to provide its members with "the big stick" for their use when they are negotiating 
with private property owners.4 
4
 In its initial brief, filed February 4, 2010, the UPA stated, "Oil miners [sic] would 
much prefer to negotiate themselves onto their leaseholds or mineral estates. Coming to 
terms with surface owners far surpasses the costs in time and expense of litigating access. 
But when the big stick is needed it is nice to have it available" (UPA Br. 21-22, filed 
Feb. 4, 2010.) When the UPA filed its Corrected and Amended Brief, this language was 
deleted. 
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The arguments by Marion/SITLA and the UP A, that the trial court erred because 
the term "mineral" always includes oil and gas, deliberately ignore this Court's recent 
statement to the contrary finding that the term "mineral" has no fixed and definite 
meaning and that it is necessary to look to the context in which it is used to determine its 
scope and meaning.5 The differing definitions of the term "mineral" in other Utah 
statutes further evidences this fact. The authority cited by Marion/SITLA fails to support 
its position to the contrary. 
Finally, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is not contrary to any public 
policy of this state and does not produce any absurd or unintended result. The trial 
court's ruling does not - as Marion/SITLA argue - prevent all forms of access to 
Marion's lease. Marion/SITLA want to take KFJ's property in order to gain the least 
expensive form of access, but the statute does not give them that right. Neither does the 
ruling circumvent SITLA's ability to obtain full value from the lease. SITLA can still 
receive all rent and royalty payments to which it is entitled. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded Marion/SITLA does not have 
authority under Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation statute to take KFJ's land for 
roads in connection with its oil and gas leases. The only way to establish the power to 
condemn that Marion/SITLA seeks is through argument and inference, and therefore the 
Marion/SITLA is clearly aware of this statement of law as KFJ cited to and relied 
on this authority in its briefing before the trial court. (R.000081-R.000082) 
Marion/SITLA's and the UPA's complete failure to address this highly relevant authority 
in its briefing on appeal is suprising. 
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power does not exist. Marion/SITLA and the UPA should be asking the legislature - not 
the courts - to insert the terms oil and gas into Subsection 501(6)(a). The trial court's 
ruling should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT MARION/SITLA DOES 
NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO TAKE KFJ'S PRIVATE LAND UNDER THE 
CONDEMNATION STATUTE. 
1. The Condemnation Statute Should Be Strictly Construed in Conferring 
the Power of Eminent Domain. 
As eloquently stated by Chief Justice Henriod, "In our American system a 
person's private property is supposed to be inviolable, unless the taking of it is urgent and 
for the commonwealth, is designated with exactitude, and proven to be absolutely 
necessary by the highest type of evidence, backed by the highest type and clearest of 
legislation." Great Salt Lake Autk v. Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah 
1966) (Henriod, C.J., dissenting), rehearing granted and decision reversed, 421 P.2d 504 
(Utah 1966). In the same context, Justice Callister stated, "The exercise of the power of 
eminent domain, being contrary to the inherent rights of property ownership by 
individuals cannot be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful language in a statute, 
but must be given in express terms or by necessary implication. When the right to 
exercise the power can only be made out of argument and inference, it does not exist." 
Id. at 968-69 (Callister, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). 
Because Marion/SITLA contend that Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation 
statute gives them the power to take KFJ's private property for a road in connection with 
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the extraction of oil and gas, the parameters of that provision must be read restrictively. 
See Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Utah 1950) ("When the power of eminent 
domain is given by statute, it is a well settled principle of law amply supported by cases 
from many jurisdictions in this country, that the extent to which the power may be 
exercised is limited to the express terms and clear implication of the statute....The right 
of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, 
has been strictly construed by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of 
the use and enjoyment of his property.")(citations omitted). See generally 26 Am. Jur. 2d 
Eminent Domain § 24 (2004). 
Subsection 501(6)(a) does not expressly authorize a taking of private property for 
the use of roads in connection with oil and gas. Moreover, as discussed below, authority 
for such a taking is not necessarily implicit in the statute, particularly given that oil and 
gas are expressly referred to in a related subsection of the statute in connection with 
taking of private property for pipelines but not in connection with roads, and also given 
that "mineral deposits" has been defined elsewhere by the legislature to expressly exclude 
"oil and gas." See infra at Sections A.2 & A.3, pages 15-21. 
Thus, in the words of Justice Callister, "when the right to exercise the power [to 
condemn] can only be made out of argument and inference, it does not exist." Great Salt 
Lake Autk, 414 P.2d at 968-69. 
The UPA misses the point when it argues that Subsection 501(6)(a) should be 
construed expansively in determining whether that provision grants the particular 
condemnation authority claimed by Marion/SITLA. The UPA overstates the language 
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from Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371 (Utah 1904). That case involved the question of whether 
the construction and operation of irrigation ditches is a public use. Id. at 373. In 
construing the constitutional language that "private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation/' the Court noted two divergent lines 
of decisions - one holding that "public use" meant a use by the public or its agencies, and 
the other holding that it is a public use when the taking is for a use that will promote the 
public interest. Id. at 373. The Court opted to follow the latter, more liberal 
interpretation. Id. The Court, however, did not depart from the long-established rule that 
condemnation statutes will be construed restrictively to ensure that citizens will not be 
deprived of the use and enjoyment of their private property, nor did the Court undermine 
the notion that the authority to take private property must be expressly stated or 
necessarily implied in the language of the eminent domain provisions. Rather, the Court 
was concerned with the constitutional validity of the condemnation provision itself- not 
with the construction of the provision dealing with ditches.6 Id. at 373-75. 
The issue of whether "mines" or "minerals" is a public purpose was not raised 
before the trial court, and the Supreme Court does not address arguments brought for the 
first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional 
circumstances exist. Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, \ 34, 212 P.3d 535 (citing State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, % 16, 94 P.3d 186). See also infra Section D, page 38. 
Moreover, the UPA's entire Section I of its brief, entitled "Eminent Domain Statutes 
Should Be Construed Expansively," is inapposite. (UPA Br. 3-4.) The issue in this case 
is not the constitutionality of the public uses in the condemnation statute - where the 
public versus private use should be given a liberal construction - but rather whether those 
public uses clearly express the authority for the taking proposed by Marion/SITLA, i.e., 
taking of private property for roads to gain access to oil and gas leases related to other 
property - the statutory language in determining whether the authority has been granted 
should be construed restrictively. 
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Nor do the "three major cases" cited by the UP A depart from these principles. 
(UPA Br. 3.) In Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, 78 P. 296, 297-99 (Utah 
1904), at issue was the constitutionality of the legislature's determination that a tramway 
is a public use. The Court concluded that it was, ruling that unless it clearly appears that 
the use in question is private and in no sense public, the validity of the statute must be 
upheld. Id. at 297. Again, the Court was not dealing with the construction of the 
condemnation statute itself, and the Court's opinion did not diverge from the notion of 
strict construction of such statutes. 
In Monetaire Mining Co, v. Columbus Rexall Consol Mines Co., the Court 
examined the language of the condemnation statute to determine whether the particular 
purpose in question had been granted by the legislature, and ruled that once "the right of 
eminent domain is granted for a particular purpose, then the statute must be given a 
liberal construction in furtherance of such purpose." 174 P. 172, 175 (Utah 1918) 
(emphasis added). In that case, the court held that the statute clearly conferred the 
authority to take private property for a tunnel to facilitate the working of mines. Id. at 
175. Rather than taking land to build a new tunnel to transport ore from the mines, the 
court allowed the plaintiff to exercise that authority to take an easement in the 
defendant's existing tunnel and jointly use that tunnel with the defendant. Id. at 174-77. 
This is liberal construction of how the authority is exercised, once the authority has been 
n 
Indeed, the statute provided then, as it does now: "(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, 
tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or 
other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits 
...." Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 174-75 (citing Comp. Laws 1907, section 3588, as 
amended by chapter 47, laws of Utah 1909, page 501.) (Emphasis added.) 
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granted - not liberal construction of the language to determine whether the authority has 
been granted. 
Finally, in Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 31 P.2d 624, 628 (Utah 
1934), the authority sought by the condemnor was for a use clearly within the express 
language of the statute, being a natural outlet for water from the condemnor's works for 
the reduction of ores. The Court merely restated that the condemnation statute must be 
liberally construed to effect the purpose expressed by the legislature, which in this 
instance was that "the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of ... outlets, 
natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, 
smelters, or other works for the reduction of ores ...." Id. at 627. Similarly, Freeman 
Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119 F.2d 16, 19-20 (10th Cir. 1941), cited 
by the UP A, involved a case in which the condemnation statute clearly conferred 
authority for the taking and merely stands for the proposition, like Monetaire Mining Co., 
that where the authority to condemn for a particular purpose is expressly conferred, 
courts can be liberal in determining how the authority is exercised in furtherance of that 
purpose. Here, however, the authority Marion/SITLA seeks to exercise has not been 
clearly conferred. In fact, it has not been conferred at all. The cases cited by the UP A, 
therefore, are inapposite. 
2. Roads for Access to Oil and Gas Leases Are Not an Express Public Use 
Under the Condemnation Statute, 
On its face, Utah Code Ann. section 78B-6-501(6) does not expressly provide for 
the taking of private property for permanent roads to access oil and gas leases. Nor is 
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such authority necessarily implied from the language of Subsection 501(6)(a). The Court 
would have to interpret the term "mineral deposits" to include oil and gas in order for 
Marion/SITLA to have the power to condemn KFJ's private property. But one cannot 
merely conclude that the term "mineral deposits" necessarily includes "oil and gas" for at 
least two independent reasons. First, the term "mineral deposits" does not always include 
"oil and gas." Indeed, the legislature has specifically defined "mineral deposit" in Title 
40, Mines and Mining, to exclude oil and gas: "'Deposit' or 'mineral deposit' excludes 
sand, gravel, rock aggregate, water, geothermal steam, and oil and gas ...." Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-8-4(6)(b) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
Second, this Court has specifically held that the term "mineral" has no fixed or 
definite meaning, and what the term actually means depends on the context: 
4[M]ineraF is a word of general language, and not per se a term of art. It 
does not have a definite meaning. It is used in many senses. It is not 
capable of a definition of universal application, but is susceptible to 
limitation or expansion according to the intention with which it is used in 
the particular instrument or statute. Regard must be had to the language of 
the instrument in which it occurs, the relative position of the parties 
interested and the substance of the transaction which the instrument 
embodies. 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, % 32, 104 P.3d 1208 (citing Bumpus v. United 
States, 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1963)). The Court in Carrier applied basic 
principles of statutory construction and determined that although "[i]n its broadest sense, 
the term 'mineral' necessarily encompasses the term 'gravel,'" the context in which it 
was used showed that it was not intended to include gravel in that particular ordinance. 
Id. at %% 32-38. Similarly, in State Land Bd. v. State Dept. of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d 
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707, 708 (Utah 1965), this Court concluded that although in its broadest sense "other 
minerals" could include sand and gravel, in that context "other minerals" was limited to 
"something of the same general character as coal or minerals which are usually the 
subject of prospecting and mining," which are precious substances or substances of value. 
These cases clearly demonstrate there is no fixed legal definition of the term 
"mineral." Marion/SITLA's argument that the definition of "mineral" in the School and 
Institutional Trust and Land Management Act (Utah Code Ann. section 53C-1-101 et seq. 
- the "SITLA statute") does not establish that the term always includes oil and gas, and 
therefore that "mineral deposits" under Subsection 501(6)(a) necessarily includes oil and 
gas. (App. Br. 19-20.) 
While the SITLA statute provides that "Mineral includes oil, gas, and 
o 
hydrocarbons," the statute is not the condemnation statute, and Marion/SITLA still must 
have clear authority under the condemnation statute in order to take KFJ's private 
property. Moreover, the legislature's addition of "oil and gas" to the definition of 
"mineral" under the SITLA statute underscores that the legislature did not add "oil and 
gas" to the definition of "mineral deposits" under the condemnation statute, and also that 
the legislature knows how to add "oil and gas" to the term "mineral" when it intends to 
do so. Further, there is nothing in the SITLA statute that gives SITLA or its mineral 
lessees the right of eminent domain, which the legislature could have done if it wanted to 
do so. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-103(4) (West 2004). 
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Finally, what the definition in the SITLA statute also does, along with the 
legislature's definition of "mineral deposits" in the Mines and Mining statute excluding 
oil and gas, is add further support to the notion, specifically recognized by this Court, that 
the term "mineral" has no fixed meaning. See Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at % 32. 
Thus, the language of Subsection 501(6)(a) does not clearly provide 
Marion/SITLA with the power to take KFJ's private property, and that power cannot 
necessarily be implied from the term "mineral deposits." Where the power of eminent 
domain is limited to the express terms and clear implication of the condemnation statute, 
and where the legislature has not clearly included oil and gas in this provision dealing 
with roads, the authority claimed by Marion/SITLA simply does not exist, and the trial 
court's ruling, therefore, should be affirmed. 
3. Examination of the Plain Language Further Shows that the 
Condemnation Statute Does Not Authorize the Taking. 
"The fundamental consideration which transcends all others in regard to the 
interpretation and application of a statute is: What was the intent of the legislature?" CP 
Natl Corp, v. Pub. Comm'n of Utah, 638 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1981) (citing Johnson v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 411 P.2d 831 (Utah 1966)). In determining that intent, courts 
consider the language of the statute and attempt, where possible, to give effect to "every 
word, clause and sentence of a legislative enactment." Id. at 523 (citing Durfey v. Bd. of 
Educ., 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1970)). Indeed, in considering the meaning of the term 
"mineral," as used in a zoning ordinance, this Court recently stated: 
In interpreting the meaning of a statute or ordinance, we begin first by 
looking to the plain language of the ordinance. When examining the plain 
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language, we must assume that each term included in the ordinance was 
used advisedly. Additionally, 'statutory construction presumes that the 
expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.' Thus, 
we should give effect to any omission in the [statute's] language by 
presuming that the omission is purposeful. 
Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at f^ 30 (citations and quotations omitted, emphasis added). This is 
exactly what the trial court did when it gave effect to the fact that oil and gas uses are 
dealt with specifically under Subsection 501(6)(d) and not specifically included in 
Subsection 501(6)(a). Precedent from this Court shows the trial court's approach was 
correct. 
The Court in Carrier applied the required assumptions that each term is used 
advisedly and that each omission is purposeful, and concluded that gravel pits were not 
included under the term "mineral excavation." Id. at f 35. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court found that the specific inclusion of the term "gravel pit" in other zoning 
ordinances issued by the same county, while omitting that term in the ordinance in 
question, showed a "gravel pit" was not a permitted use under the ordinance and not 
intended to be included under that term. Id. 
Similarly, in CP Natl Corp., this Court found that the plaintiff had no authority to 
take private property under the same condemnation statute considered here. 638 P.2d at 
522-24. The Court concluded that the statute did not confer authority to take an ongoing 
public utility business under the general term "all other public uses" because the public 
utility use was dealt with intentionally in another subsection, and the provision in 
question did not specifically include the authority to take an existing public utility 
business: 
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The public utility use appears to have been considered and dealt with 
intentionally. Section 78-34-1(8) specifically provides that 'electric light 
and electric power lines and sites for electric light and power plants' are 
subject to condemnation for public use. Nowhere is this basic grant 
broadened by other statutory authority. Clearly, [section] 78-34-1(8) 
contemplates a condemnation limited to the 'lines and sites' for a power 
plant. 
Id. at 524. The Court went on to recognize that if the legislature had intended to include 
broader authority, it would have done so expressly in that section or in another statutory 
instrument. Id. 
Likewise in this case, as the trial court correctly concluded, oil and gas is 
intentionally dealt with under Subsection 501(6)(d) of the condemnation statute, and that 
section does not include a right to take private property for a road. Rather, that 
subsection only authorizes the taking of private property for "gas, oil or coal pipelines, 
tanks or reservoirs ...." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(d) (emphasis added). By 
dealing specifically with oil and gas uses in Subsection 501(6)(d), it is clear the 
legislature knew how to provide for oil and gas uses, and the omission of roads in 
Subsection 501(6)(a) must be assumed purposeful. See Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at % 30. If 
the legislature had intended to include the authority to take private land for a road to 
facilitate the working of oil and gas deposits, it would have included that authority in 
Subsection 501(6)(d) or specifically included oil and gas in Subsection 501(6)(a). It did 
neither. 
Additionally, in Subsection 501(6)(a), the legislature has referred expressly to 
"roads" to facilitate the working of "coal mines" without making any reference to "oil 
and gas," yet in Subsection 501(6)(d), the legislature expressly referenced "gas, oil or 
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coal pipelines." Again, the legislature's omission of oil and gas when referring to "coal" 
in one context, and then referring to oil and gas together with coal in the other context, 
demonstrates an intention on the part of the legislature to differentiate between "roads" 
on the one hand and "pipelines" on the other in this regard. 
Moreover, where, as here, a term is not included, courts refrain from rewriting the 
statute to include that term. See, e.g., State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah App. 1993) 
(declining to "rewrite section 76-5-102.6 to include actions that are not expressed in the 
statute since it is the legislature's job .... Judicial responsibility to construe statutes must 
not be confused with legislative responsibility to enact them."); In re M.E.P., 2005 UT 
App. 227, f^ 11, 114 P.3d 596 (refuting defendant's position and stating that "Defendant's 
argument essentially asks this court to take on the role of the legislature and insert the 
term 'overly' into the statute. We cannot do this."). Marion/SITLA and the UPA should 
be asking the legislature - not the courts - to insert the terms oil and gas into Subsection 
501(6)(a).9 See Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App. 188,^[10 n3, 186 P.3d 960 (noting, "our 
responsibility is to interpret the language of the statute and that matters of policy such as 
this one are best resolved through the legislative process.") 
Thus, as the trial court correctly concluded, the plain language shows that the 
legislature did not provide express authority in Subsection 501(6)(a) to take private 
property to construct permanent roads to facilitate the drilling and extraction of oil and 
gas by way of those roads. 
As discussed below, a bill was introduced in the legislature in 1997 to amend 
Subsection 501(6)(a) to include oil and gas in that subsection, but the bill was not passed. 
See infra at Section A.5, page 23. 
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4. Application of Standard Rules of Statutory Construction Also Support 
the Trial Court's Ruling. 
Application of the rule of ejusdem generis further supports the trial court's 
conclusion that Marion/SITLA does not have the authority to take KFJ's land, and that 
the legislature's use of the term "mineral deposits" under Subsection 501(6)(a) was not 
intended to include oil and gas deposits. "[EJjusdem generis requires that 'when general 
words or terms follow specific ones, the general must be understood as applying to things 
of the same kind as the specific.'" CP Natl Corp., 638 P.2d at 523 (citing Heathman v. 
Giles, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah 1962)). The term "mineral" is general in nature, and use 
of the rule is appropriate here. See Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at f^ 32. 
In CP Natl Corp., this Court applied ejusdem generis to determine whether the 
provision "all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, 
or the inhabitants thereof conferred the authority to take an ongoing public utility 
business. 638 P.2d at 521-523. The court concluded the language did not confer such 
authority because the language came at the end of a series of uses limited to real property, 
and the taking of a public utility, which is an ongoing business, is more than just real 
property and not included within that term. Id. at 523. 
Further, in State Land Bd., 408 P.2d at 708, this Court applied the same principles 
of construction and found the term "other minerals" did not include gravel and sand 
because the term "other minerals" was associated with the term "coal," which indicated it 
was intended to refer to "something of the same general character as coal or minerals 
which are usually the subject of prospecting and mining." Id. 
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Similarly, interpreting the term "mineral deposits" in accordance with the 
character and meaning of the surrounding words would limit that term to minerals that 
are generally developed by "milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores," or by "mines, 
quarries, [and] coal mines." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a). Oil and gas deposits 
are developed using drills and wells and, therefore, under ejusdem generis^ roads in 
connection with oil and gas wells would not be of the same general character. 
Accordingly, the rule of construction ejusdem generis also supports the trial court's 
conclusion. 
Furthermore, the cases cited by Marion/SITLA for the proposition that ejusdem 
generis should not be used where a term is not ambiguous, where it is difficult to know 
what characteristic of the listed items should be compared, and where it would give 
narrower limits to a term than those intended by lawmakers are not applicable or relevant 
to the issue in this case. (App. Br. 15-16.) 
As clearly set forth in the transcript of proceedings, the trial court examined the 
language of the statute and relied on the presumption that each term is used advisedly and 
that an omission is presumed purposeful. (R.000225, 23 and R.000216) Based on those 
assumptions, the trial court found that use of the terms "oil" and "gas" in Subsection 
501(6)(d), while those terms were omitted in Subsection 501(6)(a), was determinative of 
the legislature's intent. (R000225, 23-25 and R.000216) The court apparently did not 
rely on the doctrine of ejusdem generis in reaching its conclusion. Nevertheless, 
Marion/SITLA ignore the trial court's analysis in this regard and engage in a lengthy 
22 
discussion of why the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not apply, without showing why 
they believe the trial court's decision was unsupported. 
5. Legislative History Further Supports the Trial Court's Ruling. 
The condemnation statute's legislative history provides further support for the trial 
court's conclusion that Subsection 501(6)(a) does not confer authority to take private 
property for roads to access oil and gas deposits. Indeed, the legislature has had 
numerous opportunities to amend the eminent domain statute to provide expressly the 
power to condemn private property for roads to facilitate oil and gas development but has 
not done so. 
Under the laws of Utah, 1896, the legislature declared the "mining, milling, 
smelting or other reduction of ores ... to be for the public use" and stated that "the right 
of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf thereof." 1896 Utah Laws 316. 
In 1898, the legislature synthesized various provisions into one section and 
allowed the use of eminent domain "to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction 
of ores, or the working of mines ...." Utah Rev. Stat. § 3588(6) (1898). Also, in 1898, 
the word "oil" was added to "gas" for the purpose of permitting condemnation for "gas or 
oil pipe lines, tanks, or reservoirs ...." Id. At the same time, the legislature did not 
clarify the working of mines to express that such mining included oil and gas operations. 
In 1907, the legislature amended Subsection 6 to allow the power of eminent 
domain for the "working of mines, quarries or mineral deposits ...." 1907 Utah Laws 
143. The legislature amended that language in 1917 to allow for the "working of... coal 
mines," amending Subsection 6 to read: "roads ... to facilitate the milling, smelting, or 
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other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits 
...." Utah Comp. Laws § 7330(6) (1917). Thus, the 1907 language was not considered 
broad enough to permit the power of condemnation for the working of a coal mine. Yet 
the legislature did not add "oil and gas mines." 
In 1963, the legislature amended Subsection 6 to allow condemnation for "coal 
pipe lines," along with oil and gas pipe lines. 1963 Utah Laws 632. Although "coal" was 
added to oil and gas pipe lines in Subsection 6, the legislature did not add oil and gas to 
the express reference to "coal mines" in that subsection. Id. 
In 1969, the legislature amended the statute to add "minerals in solution" to the 
term "mineral deposits." 1969 Utah Laws 1004. Importantly, the legislature expressly 
added "minerals in solution" - it did not leave the power to condemn private property for 
roads in this regard to be inferred from the statutory language. 
In 1997, Senator Mike Dmitrich introduced Senate Bill 156, which proposed Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-34-1(6) - now Utah Code Ann. section 78B-6-501(6)(a) - be 
amended to specifically include authority to take land for roads to access oil and gas 
deposits, as follows: 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may 
be exercised on behalf of the following public uses: 
(6) Roads . . . to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of ore, or 
working of mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral deposits including deposits 
of oil, gas and hydrocarbons, minerals in solution, and geothermal steam. 
(R.000097 - S. B. 156, 1997 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 1997)). Even though the bill was not 
enacted into law and was struck at the end of the congressional session (R.000094), there 
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would not have been any need to introduce the bill in the first place if the legislature had 
already provided that "mineral deposits" included oil and gas deposits. This further 
corroborates the already obvious intent of the legislature - demonstrated through the 
language of Subsection 501(6)(a), with its omission of oil and gas, and Subsection 
501(6)(d), with its inclusion of oil and gas - that Subsection 501(6)(a) was not intended 
to confer authority to take land for roads in connection with oil and gas mineral leases. 
Moreover, by seeking to add the authority to take land for roads to access oil and 
gas deposits, the legislature must have recognized that authority was not included under 
the terms of the current statute. For example, in Bertagnoli, this Court concluded that the 
legislature, by remaining silent on the matter, had not impliedly intended to confer 
extraterritorial powers of condemnation on the boards of education. 215 P.2d at 629-30. 
The Court concluded that in light of subsequent enactments, which conferred the disputed 
authority, the boards did not previously possess this authority because the enactments 
would have been unnecessary. Id. Likewise, if oil and gas had been included within the 
term "mineral deposits," Senator Dmitrich's proposed bill, which specifically included oil 
and gas, would have been unnecessary. 
Despite ample opportunity to do so, the legislature has not provided the power or 
authority for oil and gas companies to condemn their way across private property to gain 
road access to proposed oil and gas wells under their leases. The legislative history of the 
statute, including introduction of S.B. 156, therefore, further supports the trial court's 
conclusion that Marion/SITLA did not have authority under Subsection 501(6)(a) to take 
KFJ's private land. 
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6. The Trial Court's Ruling Is Not an Unfair or Unexpected Result. 
The trial court's finding that Marion/SITLA does not have authority under the 
condemnation statute to take KFJ's land is not an unfair or unexpected result. As an 
experienced lessee of mineral rights, Marion should be well aware that courts do not 
allow federal lease holders rights of access across private land to access or transport 
product to or from areas subject to pooling or unitization agreements, unless the federal 
lease or an agreement expressly provides for such access. Kysar v. Amoco Prod, Co., 93 
P.3d 1272, 1283-86 (N.M. 2004) (denying oil company rights to use roads on 
landowner's ranch that were not subject to the pooling or unitization agreement to access 
the producing well in the area subject to the agreement). Just as it would in connection 
with a mineral lease on federal lands, Marion should have ensured that it had road access 
to its SITLA leases by negotiating with KFJ prior to purchasing those lease rights. 
Marion is certainly not new to the oil and gas industry, and is familiar with the necessity 
of negotiating with private land owners for access to its federal leases and the cost and 
expense associated with obtaining that access. It is not unfair to require Marion to do the 
same here with its state leases. 
B. THE AUTHORITY CITED BY MARION/SITLA DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
CLAIM THAT "MINERAL DEPOSITS" IN THE CONDEMNATION STATUTE 
INCLUDES OIL AND GAS. 
In an attempt to support their contention that the term "mineral" has a fixed and 
definite meaning that includes oil and gas, Marion/SITLA rely on four cases, Nephi 
Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab Co., 93 P.53 (Utah 1907), Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-
Bingham ConsoL Mining Co,, 255 P. 672 (Utah 1926); Western Dev, Co, v. Nell, 288 
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P.2d 452 (Utah 1955); and Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
820 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1987). These cases are inapposite because they deal with 
transactions between private parties or statutes totally unrelated to the condemnation 
statute. Moreover, the cases do not establish that the term "mineral" has a fixed and 
definite meaning or that the trial court in this case erred by looking to the language of the 
condemnation statute to determine its meaning. Indeed, the cases either fail to address 
the issue or merely recognize, at least impliedly, that the term "mineral" is defined by the 
context in which it is used. Finally, the courts in these cases also looked to the language 
of the documents to establish the scope and meaning of the term "mineral." 
For example, in Nephi the court considered whether gypsum - not oil and gas -
was included under the phrase "other valuable mineral deposits." 93 P. at 54-55. 
Whether the term "mineral" included oil and gas was not even at issue, nor did the case 
establish that the term "mineral" is unambiguous and has a universal meaning that 
includes oil and gas. Id. at 55-58. Nephi is only useful in this case, if at all, to 
demonstrate that the court's role is to determine the intent of the legislature in drafting 
the statute, and that rules of statutory construction, where applicable, are a means of 
establishing that intent. Even Marion/SITLA admit the case does not support their 
conclusion, stating that they are relying on it solely because the Court in that case 
adopted an "expansive definition" of the term "minerals." (App. Br. 12.) 
Indeed, the purported "expansive definition" of "minerals" was not in the context 
of eminent domain, where the right to take private property is strictly construed, but in 
the context of a taxing statute. See, e.g., McCabe Petroleum Corp. v. Easement and 
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Right-of-Way, 87 P3d 479, 482 (Mont. 2004) ("our characterizations of an oil well as a 
mine were made within the context of tax litigation, not eminent domain statutes which 
expressly enumerate the public uses for which condemnation proceedings can be 
maintained"). Definitions from other contexts are not readily imported into the eminent 
domain arena. Id. 
Marion/SITLA rely on Utah Copper for the proposition that this Court conceded 
that the term "mineral" includes "oil and gas." (App. Br. at 12.) Marion/SITLA 
overstate the Court's ruling. In Utah Copper, the Court was required to determine the 
ownership of rain water that contained copper - the actual definition of "mineral" was not 
even at issue. 255 P. at 673-74. The Court held that "the waters carrying copper or other 
minerals in solution, so long as they are in the dump and thus a part of it, ... are, like the 
dump itself, the property of the plaintiff...." Id. at 674. The Court added: 
The cases cited by the appellant do not, as we think, make against this 
holding. The case of Nephi Plaster Co. v. Juab County ... is cited to the 
effect that the term 'mineral' is not limited to metal or metaliferous deposits 
but also includes petroleum and other liquids. That may be conceded. The 
point made in such respect is that copper in solution is a mineral, and, 
though the dump on the defendant's ground is the property of the plaintiff, 
nevertheless the mineral in solution is the property of the defendant. But 
the defendant makes no claim to any of the ore or other material deposited 
on the dump; and, since the copper in solution is from the dump and from 
the ore and material deposited thereon and therein and not otherwise, it 
would seem that the defendant has no better claim to the mineral in 
solution, so long as it is in the dump, than to the ore or other material in the 
dump. 
Id. at 674-5 (emphasis added). Clearly, the Court was not conceding that the term 
"mineral" includes "petroleum and other liquids;" rather, the Court was making it clear 
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that even if it does, this would not affect the Court's ruling as to ownership. Utah 
Copper has no relevance to this case, and Marion/SITLA's use of the case is misleading. 
Finally, Marion/SITLA's reliance on the decisions in Nell and Anschultz is 
unavailing. In those cases, the courts were required to examine the language of deeds of 
conveyance - not statutes - to determine the scope and meaning of the term "mineral" as 
used in those deeds. Nell, 288 P.2d at 453-55; Anschutz, 820 F.2d at 340-43. In both 
these cases, the court recognized the "majority rule" that when considering the term 
"mineral" as used in a deed, lease or license, a conveyance or exception of 'minerals' is 
to be understood to include oil and gas, unless a contrary intent is manifested. See Nell, 
288 P.2d at 454; Anschutz, 820 F.2d at 342. Having adopted this rule, the courts looked 
to the language of the deeds to determine if a contrary intent was manifested. Nell, 288 
P.2d at 454-55; Anschutz, 820 F.2d at 342-43. 
In Nell, the court determined that the language of the deed gave rise to ambiguities 
in the meaning of the term "mineral," and considered extrinsic evidence of the 
circumstances at the time the deed was executed to determine the parties' intent. 288 
P.2d at 454-55. In Anschultz, the court determined that the parties' intent was clear from 
the language of the document and did not look to extrinsic evidence to determine that 
intent.10 Anschutz, 820 F.2d at 342-43. These cases show nothing more than an 
10
 The court found no ambiguity as to whether the deeds reserved rights to oil and 
gas deposits because Reservations B and C expressly reserved those rights and 
Reservation A reserved "all minerals" "prospected for," which the court determined 
included oil and gas because oil and gas are usually "prospected for." Anschutz. 820 F.2d 
at 342-43. The Court did not, as Marion/SITLA claim, find that the term "mineral" 
includes oil and gas as a matter of law. (App. Br. 14.) 
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examination by the court of the language of the deeds and, where appropriate, extrinsic 
evidence of the intent of the parties to determine what they intended to convey when 
drafting those deeds. The cases do not establish a universal definition of the term 
"mineral" that includes oil and gas, nor do they in any way alter the principle of strict 
construction of statutes granting the power of eminent domain. 
Marion/SITLA place great importance on the Nell court's reference to the 
"majority rule" that a conveyance or reservation of minerals is presumed to include oil 
and gas. (App. Br. 13-14.) That "majority rule," however, is a rule of construction 
limited to interpretation of the scope and meaning of the term "mineral" in deeds, leases 
and licenses when a deed, lease or license conveys or reserves a right or interest in 
"minerals." See Annotation, What are Minerals within Deed, Lease or License, 86 ALR 
986 (1933). It is not a rule to establish the meaning of the term "mineral" in all 
circumstances. Indeed, the paramount concern in considering the language of deeds is to 
determine the intention of the parties to the deed, which controls. As discussed above, 
however, grants of eminent domain must be strictly construed against the condemnor, and 
if the authority to condemn is not clearly expressed or necessarily implied, the right does 
not exist. See supra at Sections A.2. & A.3, pages 15-21. These cases are simply 
inapposite here, where the issue is construction of the eminent domain statute. 
Furthermore, even if these cases were apposite, there is authority to the contrary 
that the term "minerals" as used in a deed was not intended to include oil and gas. 
Indeed, in G.O, Patterson v. Wilcox, 358 P.2d 88, 89-91 (Utah 1961), the Court was 
again required to determine the scope and meaning of the term "mineral" as used in a 
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deed of conveyance. In that case the Court came to the contrary conclusion, finding that 
the term "mineral" was not intended to include oil and gas. Id. The Court specifically 
noted that although it had come to a conclusion contrary to the one reached in Nell, the 
decision in Nell was "justified under the facts of that case." Id. at 91. 
Nell, Anschutz, and G.O. Patterson all concern a determination of the term 
"mineral" in a deed conveying or reserving an interest in "minerals" and rules relevant 
only to determination of that term in those types of contracts. They provide little, if any, 
assistance in determining the intent of the legislature in its use of the term "mineral 
deposits" in Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation statute or even the interpretation 
of the term "mineral" in statutes generally. If anything, these cases again highlight both 
the ambiguity of the term "mineral" and the importance of looking to the context in 
which the term is used to determine its scope and meaning. 
Again, the existence of contradictory authority interpreting the term "mineral" as 
either including or excluding a certain material reinforces the conclusion that its meaning 
is uncertain and defined by the context in which it is used. See Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at f 
34 (recognizing that the parties' citation to contradictory authority in support of their 
position that "mineral" either includes or excludes gravel "merely reinforce[d] the 
conclusion that whether gravel is appropriately deemed a mineral depends on the context 
in which the term is used"). Accordingly, the authority cited by Marion/SITLA does not 
establish that "mineral" has a fixed and definite meaning, and the trial court was correct 
to examine the language of the condemnation statute to determine the scope and meaning 
of that term under Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation statute. 
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C. THE AUTHORITY CITED BY THE UPA DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
VIEW THAT IN UTAH "MINERALS" INCLUDES OIL AND GAS. 
As it did with respect to the cases discussed above in Section A.l, the UPA 
overstates the significance of the Wyoming case of Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 
P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979). (UPA Br. at 4-6.) Obviously, Coronado is not binding authority 
in Utah, but importantly the court's analysis is not persuasive because it is clearly 
inconsistent with Utah Supreme Court jurisprudence. Moreover, as the UPA belatedly 
pointed out in its Corrected and Amended Brief, there is other, far more persuasive 
authority in Colorado and Montana that, more recently, runs counter to Coronado. 
In Coronado, a split court held that the exploration for oil and gas is "mining" 
within the meaning of the Wyoming condemnation statutes in question dealing with the 
right to condemn a way of necessity over land in connection with mining. 603 P.2d at 
412. At the outset, KFJ should point out that the UPA misstates the premise of Coronado 
when it states that "the Wyoming Supreme Court held that a power of condemnation for 
'minerals^ - in a statute very similar to the Act - included power to access an oil and gas 
well-site." (UPA Br. at 5.) (Emphasis added.) Contrary to the UPA's description of this 
case, the case involved a power of condemnation of "mining" - not of "minerals," which 
is closer to what is at issue in this case.11 Coronado, 603 P.2d at 411-12. Moreover, the 
11
 As noted above in footnote 6, page 12, the issue of whether "mining" includes 
exploration for oil and gas was not raised before the trial court, and this Court does not 
address arguments brought for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed 
plain error or exceptional circumstances exist. Jacob, 2009 UT 37 at ^ 34. See also infra 
Section D, page 38.) Marion/SITLA did not argue below that the language in the 
condemnation statute relating to "mining" (as opposed to "mineral deposits") gives rise to 
their power to condemn KFJ's property for road access. 
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Wyoming statute is not "very similar" to the Utah condemnation statute at issue. Indeed, 
the Wyoming condemnation statute does not concern "minerals" or "mineral deposits" at 
all, and it does not involve the construction of the language at issue in this case under 
Utah Code Ann. section 78B-501(6)(a).12 
The Wyoming court acknowledged the principle, followed in Utah, that "[a]s a 
general rule, statutes conferring the power of eminent domain are to be strictly construed 
in favor of landowners, so that no person will be deprived of the use and enjoyment of his 
property except by a valid exercise of the power." Coronado, 603 P.2d at 410. But the 
court departed from this general principle and from Utah law by determining that "this 
doctrine does not preclude the reasonable and sound construction of such statutes in light 
of the objectives and purposes sought to be attained." Id. at 410-11. The court noted 
that, at least in 1979, there was a "great public interest in an imminent need for energy," 
stating, "[w]hile at the time of adoption of the constitution the concern was one of 
developing the economy and settlement of the state, the urgency has now become one of 
survival." Id. at 411. On that basis, the court stated, "[w]e think it plain beyond any 
doubt that the intended purpose of the cited constitutional provision and statutes was to 
12
 The UPA's statement that "Wyoming's eminent domain statutes like Utah's do not 
identify minerals by type, but did refer to 'mining' and 'minerals'" (UPA Br. at 5) is, at 
best, mistaken. The statute deals with the condemnation of a way of necessity over 
property as necessary for the use of tramways or mine truck haul roads required in the 
course of the business of mining or for the transportation of coal from any coal mine or 
railroad line. The only reference to "minerals" in the statutes addressed by the court was 
the provision that any way of necessity appropriated under the statute is for a surface 
easement only - it does not include any interest in the underlying minerals or mineral 
estate. Coronado, 603 P.2d at 408. 
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facilitate the development of our state's resources. We will hereafter construe the word 
'mining' to include the exploration for oil and gas ...." Id. 
In abandoning the principle that other courts, including Utah, have long followed, 
the Wyoming court ignored time-honored rules of statutory construction and the principle 
that courts have no authority to substitute their views for those expressed by the 
legislature in establishing public purposes for the exercise of eminent domain. While the 
UPA would have this Court follow the Wyoming Supreme Court in this regard, the 
court's ruling flies in the face of Utah jurisprudence to the effect that the condemnation 
statute must be strictly construed, that it is for the legislature to determine the public 
purposes for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised, that courts should 
follow time-honored rules of statutory construction, and that the term "minerals" in Utah 
has no fixed or definite meaning and what the term actually means depends on the 
context. 
Not surprisingly, there was a dissent in which Justice Rooney attempted to remind 
the court of certain well-established principles it was flouting: 
The power of eminent domain is one of the most harsh proceedings known 
to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates this power to a 
political unity or agency, a strict construction must be given against the 
agency asserting the power. 
Id. at 422. Further, the dissent noted: 
[W]e cannot overlook the importance of private ownership of property in 
the maintenance of the capitalistic system under which this country 
operates. Indeed, such ownership is one of the fundamental differences 
between our democracy and communism. Although federal and eastern 
corporate ownership, as distinguished from local and family unit 
ownership, of Wyoming real property may have already 'steamrolled' to a 
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point wherein it is inevitable, and although full-scale development and 
utilization of the minerals and other natural resources of our state may be 
desirable and necessary, these ends should be attained within the scope of 
law and with full recognition of property and constitutional rights of others. 
Mat417.1 3 
Other neighboring states have not followed Coronado. In McCabe, for example, 
the Supreme Court of Montana recently was confronted with the same issue as that in 
Coronado - whether the exploration and development of a federal oil and gas lease is a 
"mine" that constitutes a "public use" for eminent domain purposes. 87 P.3d at 480. The 
court held that oil wells are not. Id. at 483. In distinguishing Coronado, the court noted 
that the eminent domain provision of Montana's constitution - like Utah's - does not 
allow the taking of private property for private ways of necessity, which may be obtained 
only by satisfying several criteria. Id. at 482. 
Pertinent to this case, the Montana Supreme Court addressed the interpretation of 
powers of eminent domain, citing long-standing judicial authority, consistent with Utah 
jurisprudence, that "the eminent domain power being against common right, [] cannot be 
implied or inferred from vague or doubtful language, and that the right to exercise that 
power does not exist when made out only by argument or inference." Id. at 481. 
Describing earlier Montana precedent, the court stated, "[t]here, a unanimous Court 
stated clearly and without equivocation that 4[t]he legislature's grant of the eminent 
13
 The UPA also cites to Amoco Prod. Co. v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 
1980), in support of its contention that a power of condemnation for "minerals" included 
power to access an oil and gas site. (UPA Br. at 5.) This case is merely another 
inapposite case involving the interpretation of a reservation of "minerals" in a railroad 
deed. Amoco Prod., 636 F.2d at 263. See also supra at Section B, page 27. 
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domain power ... must be strictly construed.'" Id., (citing City ofBozeman v. Vaniman, 
869 P.2d 790, 792 (Mont. 1994)). The court continued, "[b]ecause private real property 
ownership is a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution, 'any statute which 
allows [the taking of] a person's property must be given its plain interpretation, favoring 
the person's fundamental rights.'" Id. See also Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis 
Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 522 (Colo. 1982) ("[w]e have often held that narrow construction is 
the rule in determining the scope of the condemnation power delegated pursuant to 
legislative enactment.../The authority to exercise (the power of condemnation), being 
against the common right to own and keep property, must be given expressly or by clear 
implication; it can never be implied from doubtful language.'"). 
In analyzing the plain language of the Montana condemnation statute, the court 
determined that no public uses contained explicit language relating to oil and gas wells. 
McCabe, 87 P.3d at 483. The only eminent domain provisions relating to oil and gas 
were contained in the statutes governing oil and gas exploration, which involve 
underground storage of natural gas. Id. The court noted, "[h]ad the Montana Legislature 
intended to extend the power of eminent domain to encompass the development of oil 
wells, it easily could have done so in the portions of [the statutes] which apply to the oil 
and gas industry. It also could have done so in [the eminent domain statute]." Id. Thus, 
the court held that oil wells are not "mines" for purposes of eminent domain in Montana. 
Id 
KFJ contends that McCabe is far more persuasive authority in this case than 
Coronado for a number of reasons, not the least of which are (i) that the statutory scheme 
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in Montana is more similar to that of Utah's, in that there was no mention of oil and gas 
in the pertinent eminent domain statute addressing roads, yet there was a reference to 
authority to exercise eminent domain for oil and gas purposes in another statutory context 
addressing pipelines; and (ii) that the pertinent eminent domain principles relied upon and 
followed by the Supreme Court of Montana are in-step with Utah's, while Wyoming 
departs from those principles because of a perceived urgent need for imminent energy 
development at the time the case was decided that the court believed threatened the 
state's very survival. 
Finally, the UPA argues that public policy considerations support the result the oil 
and gas industry seeks in this appeal, baldly stating, "The Act's articulated policy 
encourages the development of oil and gas." (UPA Br. at 6.) KFJ has been unable to 
locate any such policy articulated in the eminent domain statute. Furthermore, the UPA 
should raise its public policy considerations with the legislature because it is the 
legislature - not the courts - that, through the legislative process, should consider matters 
of public policy in this regard. See Soriano, 2008 UT App 188 at % 10, n3. Indeed, this 
Court has long adhered to the principle that "if the right [to eminent domain] is not 
granted, either in terms or by necessary implication, then the courts are powerless to grant 
the relief [requested] ...." Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 175. 
D. THE UPA HAS IMPROPERLY RAISED AN ISSUE THAT WAS NOT 
ARGUED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
Marion/SITLA's argument to the trial court below was that the term "mineral 
deposits" in Utah Code Ann. section 78B-6-501(6)(a) includes "oil and gas" and provides 
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the authority to take KFJ's property to gain access to oil and gas leases. Marion/SITLA 
did not make the arguments below, as the UPA does in its amicus brief, that "mining" 
includes oil and gas operations and that the language "the working of mines" in 
Subsection 501(6)(a) also authorizes the taking power Marion/SITLA seek. Indeed, the 
UPA devotes several pages of its amicus brief to the history of mining and argues that oil 
and gas is susceptible to "mining," citing and addressing numerous historical cases and 
authorities in that regard. (UPA Br. at 7-18.) 
The Court should not address the new arguments raised by the UPA for the first 
time on appeal, and KFJ should not be required to expend the cost associated in 
addressing these arguments. See supra at n.6 & nTl , pages 12 & 33. Furthermore, the 
cases cited by the UPA outside of the context of eminent domain are inapposite, and do 
not establish an "American Rule" that "mineral" always includes oil and gas and that 
"mining" includes oil and gas operations. 
As discussed above, there is a rule of interpretation that finds the term "mineral," 
as used in a reservation of rights in a license, lease or deed, is presumed to include oil and 
gas, unless there is ambiguity on the face of the document. See supra at Section B, page 
27. There is not, as the UPA argue, an "American Rule" that the term "mining" includes 
oil and gas operations or that oil and gas is universally considered a "mineral" in all 
circumstances, and particularly not as used in Utah's condemnation statute. 
Indeed, with the exception of Burke v. S Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669 (1914), the 
cases cited by the UPA in support of this proposition do not even consider the terms 
"mining" or "mineral" and whether oil and gas are included in those terms. At best, the 
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cases are merely instances where a court has used the phrase "oil and gas mining" when 
resolving a completely separate issue and in no way show the term "mining" includes oil 
and gas operations,14 much less in all circumstances.15 Moreover, none of the cited cases 
concern interpretation of condemnation statutes, and many of them concern licenses, 
leases or deeds - not statutes - where different considerations and standards apply. 
Although the UP A does cite Burke, a 1914 decision in which the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether petroleum or mineral oil was included within the term 
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928), concerned a dispute 
between a landowner and a holder of a federal lease. The federal lease holder wished to 
enjoin the surface owner from platting and selling the surface area above its lease, where 
the federal lease holder had the right to use whatever surface area above its lease was 
necessary to extract oil and gas. Id. at 496. The UPA cited this case merely for the 
proposition that "[throughout the case, the Court identifies the extraction operations as 
'mining operations' and the equipment and facilities as 'mining equipment'" - nothing 
more. (UPA Br. 8.) 
Similarly, Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (Pa. 1866), concerns a dispute between 
two parties regarding a private agreement that gave plaintiff the right to explore for oil 
and gas on defendant's property and whether that right was (1) an exclusive right, and (2) 
whether the plaintiff had forfeited his rights by subletting those rights to other parties. 
The case can stand for nothing more than that the court refers to the parties' activities as 
"oil and gas mining." 
Likewise, Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 185 P.2d 747 (Utah 1947), which the UPA 
so emphatically argues shows Utah adopts the American rule that development of oil and 
gas is mining, (UPA Br. 13), concerns title to a mineral lease and whether the holder had 
abandoned the lease. Again, it is cited merely because the language of the case 
references development of oil and gas as "mining for oil and gas" - nothing more. 
1:>
 Although this issue is not properly before this court, it is notable that there are in 
fact numerous cases where courts have specifically found the term "mining" does not 
include oil and gas. See, e.g., Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Murrell, 53 So. 705, 711-712 (La. 
1910); Cornwell v. Buck & Stoddard, Inc., 82 P.2d 516, 518 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938); 
Carter v. Phillips, 212 P. 747, 749-50 (Okla. 1923); Hollingsworth v. Berry, 192 P. 763, 
763-65 (Kan. 1920); Cortelyou v. Baker, 187 P. 417 (Cal. 1920); Lambert v. Pritchett, 
284 S.W. 2d 90, 91 (Ky. 1955); Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692-93 (Ohio 1898). 
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"mineral" as used in a federal law reserving "all minerals" from land grants to railroads, 
this Court has much more recently determined that the term "mineral," as used in Utah 
legislation, is general in nature, and has no fixed meaning. See Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at % 
32. 
Thus, even if the UP A had established there is a "general rule of American oil and 
gas jurisprudence" that the terms "mineral deposits" and "mining" include oil and gas, 
(UPA Br. 12), which it did not, it is clear that this "general rule" does not apply in Utah. 
Not only has this Court determined as recently as 2004 that the term "mineral" has no 
fixed meaning, see Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at f^ 32, the legislature does not treat those terms 
as though they necessarily include oil and gas - in the SITLA statute the legislature 
specifically defined "mineral" as including oil and gas," but Title 40, specifically 
governing mines and mining, defines "mining operation" and "mineral deposits" as 
specifically excluding oil and gas. See Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-103(4) (2005); Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 40-8-4(6)(b) & (14)(a). Accordingly, the legislature must expressly 
include "oil and gas" in connection with the use of the term "mineral deposits" if it wants 
to ensure oil and gas is included. 
Given that the legislature clearly includes oil and gas within the term "mineral" on 
some occasions and excludes it in others, all that can be presumed, if anything, is that the 
term "mineral" is ambiguous and where, as here, it has not been defined, no power for a 
taking in relation to oil and gas is conferred. 
Moreover, if, as the UPA argues, the legislature was so clearly aware of the oil and 
gas industry at the time the condemnation statute was enacted, (see, e.g., UPA Br. 18), 
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the fact that the legislature did not refer to oil and gas in the context of "mineral 
deposits/' while referring to oil and gas in the same condemnation statute in another 
context, demonstrates - consistent with the trial court's ruling - a lack of intent on the 
part of the legislature to subject private property to taking for roads in connection with 
purported "oil and gas mining."16 
UPA's citation to the 1872 Mining Law also fails to provide support for the fact 
that oil and gas has always been considered a mineral subject to the mining laws. (UPA 
Br. 15-16.) As highlighted by the UPA's own point, the Petroleum Placer Act was 
passed to clarify that the mining law was to apply to petroleum minerals. (UPA Br. 15.) 
If it was so clear that "mining" included oil and gas development, the legislature would 
have had no need for such a clarification. 
Finally, in an effort to force some association between oil and gas development 
and the term "working of mines," as used in Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation 
statute, the UPA argues that oil and gas development is achieved through "boring, 
digging and sinking," which have their origins in the mining vernacular. (UPA Br. 13.) 
This argument is of no assistance to the UPA, however, because those terms do not 
appear in Subsection 501(6)(a) or anywhere else in the condemnation statute. 
16
 Again, the legislature's addition of "coal mines" to the language "working of 
mines," without adding "oil and gas mining" also would be relevant to construction of the 
statute. See supra Section A.5., page 23. The UPA, however, does not address this in its 
brief. Indeed, the UPA does not address the arguments relating to the presence of oil and 
gas language in connection with pipelines but the omission of oil and gas in connection 
with roads, or the addition of both "coal mines" to the language relating to roads and 
"coal" relating to pipelines. 
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E. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS OF OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS IN 
UTAH ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF 
SUBSECTION 501(6)(A). 
The financial considerations and contributions, including the number of jobs 
provided by the oil and gas industry, raised by the UPA are simply not relevant 
considerations to a court's construction of the condemnation statute. (UPA Br. 18-20.) 
The UPA has not cited any authority to the effect that such considerations are relevant to 
a court's strict construction of the plain language of a statute to determine whether the 
legislature has intended to authorize the taking of private property. The mere interests of 
the oil and gas industry are not determinant. 
F. THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE EMINENT DOMAIN IS NOT BASED 
ON THE CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE SO-CALLED COMMON 
MAN. 
The UPA's contention that the law should change to adapt to changed conditions 
demonstrates clearly that the UPA fails to appreciate the purpose underlying the strict 
1 "7 
construction of eminent domain statutes. (UPA Br. 20-21.) Because private real 
property ownership is a fundamental right, its taking by oil companies is only permitted 
by the clearest of legislation. While the intent of "the common man in Eastland, Texas," 
As an initial point, the UPA begins Section V. of its brief by misstating KFJ's 
argument to the trial court. (UPA Br. 20.) KFJ argued in the trial court that the omission 
of oil and gas from Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation statute and its inclusion in 
Subsection 501(6)(d) showed that the legislature was aware of oil and gas development, 
knew how to provide for oil and gas uses, and clearly chose not to include oil and gas 
uses in Subsection 501(6)(a) under the term "mineral deposits." KFJ did not, as UPA 
misstates, argue that the term "mining" under Subsection 501(6)(a) cannot have been 
intended to include oil and gas. See id. As set forth above, that argument was raised for 
the first time by the UPA in its amicus brief. 
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as a party to a lease, might be interpreted one way in 1887 and another way twenty years 
later, the intent expressed by the legislature in an eminent domain statute should not be 
subject to such whim and caprice. The legislature is free to change the language in 
section 78B-6-501(6) - and in fact has on several occasions done so19 - but unless and 
until it does, a court should not interpret that language according to changing public 
perceptions on the part of the "common man" or even what the court believes a 
legislature might intend currently if it were confronted with so-called "changed 
conditions." See, e.g., Paul, 860 P.2d at 995 ("Judicial responsibility to construe statutes 
must not be confused with legislative responsibility to enact them."). Indeed, if the 
authority to take private property has to be interpreted through argument, the authority 
does not exist. See supra Section A.L, pages 10-11. If the UPA believes that the law 
should be changed in this regard, the UPA should go to the legislature to have that 
change made. 
Notably, the Luse court's approach of looking to the changing perceptions of the 
common man is not the approach adopted by Utah courts to interpret an ambiguous term 
in a deed, or the approach of courts in any other American jurisdiction of which counsel 
is aware. Not only does Luse concern interpretation of a term in a deed, not a statute, 
when interpreting ambiguous terms in contracts, Utah courts look to the intent of the 
parties at the time of entering into the contract — not the changing concepts of the 
The cases cited by the UPA do not pertain to eminent domain statutes. See Luse v. 
Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919)(reservation of coal and minerals in 
deed); Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co., 93 P. 53 (Utah 1907)(taxing statute). 
19
 See supra at Section A.5, page 23. 
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common man. See, e.g., Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT App. 92, f^ 12, 110 
P.3d 168. 
Finally, the UPA's argument in Section V of its brief is completely contrary to the 
arguments made throughout its brief that minerals and mining have always included oil 
and gas, and that they were understood at the time the condemnation act was first enacted 
to include oil and gas. 
G. PRIOR VERSIONS OF THE CONDEMNATION STATUTE DO NOT 
ESTABLISH THAT "MINERAL DEPOSITS" UNDER SUBSECTION 
501(6)(A) WAS INTENDED TO INCLUDE OIL AND GAS. 
Marion/SITLA's reference to previous versions of the condemnation statute does 
not show that the term "mineral deposits" was intended to include the authority to take 
land for roads to access oil and gas leases. (App. Br. 17-19.) As with the current 
condemnation statute, the previous versions do not contain a definition of the term 
"mineral deposits/' and the only express reference to oil and gas is to provide authority to 
take land for pipelines, tanks and reservoirs - not roads. While Marion/SITLA also 
refer to other provisions of the condemnation statute describing, for example, the 
classification of the estates and rights in land subject to be taken in connection with a 
public use, such provisions do not express what the legislature has authorized by law as a 
public use. The issue still remains whether the right sought by Marion/SITLA has been 
granted in section 78B-6-501(6)(a). 
Unlike previous versions of the statute, the current version organizes the public 
uses in Subsection 501(6) into distinct subsections - a fact the trial court found 
noteworthy. (R.000225, 24) 
44 
H. THE OUTCOME OF OTHER UTAH DISTRICT COURT CASES CITED 
BY THE UPA IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE. 
In its brief, the UPA cited eight district court cases, including this case, spanning 
the past nearly 40 years involving eminent domain rights in connection with oil and gas 
operations. (UPA Br. 21-23.) The UPA cited the cases as ''history, not precedent," to 
show that this case is not an isolated one. (UPA Br. 23.) But the UPA then proceeded to 
comment specifically on the various cases, to which KFJ Ranch will respond briefly. 
In The Anschutz Corp. v. Cunningham Ranches, Inc., Case No. 3793 (Seventh 
Dist. Ct., filed June 17, 1977), the court ruled, like the trial court in this case, that the 
condemnation statute did not permit the oil and gas company to take the defendant's 
private property to construct a road in connection with its drilling for oil and gas. Like 
the trial court, the court expressly determined that the term "minerals" in Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-34-1(6) - now section 78B-6-501(6)(a) - does not include oil and gas. 
Two other cases cited by the UPA - ANR Prod. Co. v. Burkley, Case No. 
950800003 (Eighth Dist. Ct., filed Jan. 12, 1995), and Amerada Hess Corp. v. Thousand 
Peaks Ranches, Inc., Case No. 7482 (Third Dist. Ct., filed Aug. 10, 1983) - settled before 
the respective courts made any determination as to immediate occupancy. 
In the remaining four cases, the district courts entered orders of immediate 
occupancy, but the granting of a motion for immediate occupancy does not establish 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, Case No. 4645 (Fourth Dist. Ct., filed Dec. 
28, 1971); Richardson Operating Co. v. Thousand Peaks Ranches, Inc., Case No. 
950600082 (Third Dist. Ct., filed July 11, 1995); El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Stricklen, Case No. 010800547 (Eighth Dist. Ct, filed Oct. 4, 2001); FIML Natural Res., 
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authority to condemn under the statute. Indeed, to obtain such an order, a condemnor 
need only make a prima facie showing of the right to condemn, the value of the property 
to be taken, the damage to the property to be taken, and the reason for a speedy taking. 
See, e.g., Utah State Road Coinm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984). If 
immediate occupancy is granted, the condemnor is required to post a bond, assuming the 
risk of paying for damage to the land in the event condemnation ultimately is not granted. 
Id. 
Even in these four cases in which the courts granted motions for immediate 
occupancy, at least two of the cases settled before any ultimate determination was made 
as to condemnation. FIML Natural Res., LLC v. The Estate of Robert C. Phyles, Case 
No. 060800183 (Eighth Dist. Ct, filed Nov. 29, 2006); Richardson Operating Co. v. 
Thousand Peaks Ranches, Inc., Case No. 950600082 (Third Dist. Ct., filed July 11, 1995) 
(granted motion for immediate occupancy as to taking of an ATV trail for maintaining oil 
and gas pipeline, but denied as to roads proposed for hauling equipment to and from oil 
wells.) 
In sum, the only value in citing a smattering of district court cases is to show that 
periodically this issue has arisen in the courts below, and more often than not the matters 
are concluded through voluntary settlement among the parties. 
LLC v. The Estate of Robert C Phyles, Case No. 060800183 (Eighth Dist. Ct., filed Nov. 
29, 2006). 
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I. THE ABSURD RESULTS DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Marion/SITLA contend that even if the plain language interpretation of Subsection 
501(6)(a) results in the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to authorize the 
taking of private property to construct permanent roads to facilitate the working of oil and 
gas wells, this would work an "absurd result" such that the Court should not follow the 
plain language of the statute. (App. Br. 21-22.) More specifically, Marion/SITLA 
contend that, under the trial court's interpretation, SITLA could store its oil and gas under 
Subsection 501(6)(d) but could not produce it under Subsection 501(6)(a). (App. Br. 22.) 
These contentions are not true, ignore the principles under the condemnation statute, and 
unfairly characterize the statutory scheme set up by the legislature to take those principles 
into account. 
It is not true that Marion/SITLA are prevented from accessing SITLA's oil and 
gas deposits. Through the SITLA statute, the legislature has granted a lease holder like 
Marion the limited right to enter upon the land on which it holds SITLA mineral leases. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 53C-2-401, et seq. While the SITLA statute does not give a lease 
holder any right of access over, or right to exercise eminent domain with respect to, 
private property on which SITLA does not hold the mineral rights, the lease holder - just 
like with mineral leases on federal lands - may negotiate its own access rights over the 
adjoining private property to gain access to the lease property. See supra Section A.6., 
page 26. Once such access is secured, the condemnation statute provides the right to take 
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private property for purposes of oil and gas pipelines. See Utah Code. Ann. § 78B-6-
501(6)(d). 
There is nothing "absurd" about this statutory scheme - unless, like Marion, the 
lease holder is interested only in gaining access to and transporting the oil and gas out 
from its wells in the absolutely most economical way practicable, i.e., by operating 
vehicles over private property to transport the oil and gas. But in defining the public uses 
for which the right of eminent domain may be exercised, the legislature has not stated 
that the right of condemnation may be used in whatever manner would ensure that the 
most cost-effective means can be employed. Indeed, eminent domain should only be 
used when necessary to accomplish a clearly stated public goal - not as a means to 
establish the most cost-effective method of obtaining that goal. See McKemie v. City of 
Griffin, 537 S.E.2d 66, 68 (Ga. 2000); see generally 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 
30 (2004). 
Moreover, the absurd results doctrine is a narrow exception to the normal rule of 
statutory construction that courts do not intrude upon the lawmaking powers of the 
legislature. See In re ZC.9 2007 UT 54, f 12, 165 P3d 1206 (citing Pub. Citizen v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
Indeed, this canon of statutory interpretation applies only where the result is so absurd 
that the legislature could not possibly have intended it. Id Such is not the case here, 
The rule should be applied "only where the absurdity is so gross as to shock the 
general moral or common sense; it is not enough that absurd consequences which were 
probably not within the contemplation of the legislature are produced." 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Statutes § 172 (2009) (citing Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930)). 
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where means to access and transport oil and gas from leases are available. There is 
simply nothing absurd or irrational about the result flowing from the plain language 
interpretation of the statute in this instance. 
Finally, if SITLA and members of the oil and gas industry desire to use eminent 
domain to take private property to construct permanent roads over private property rather 
than use pipelines, they have the right to go to the legislature to amend the condemnation 
statute, as was attempted at least once before through the Senate Bill introduced by 
Senator Dmitrich. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, KFJ respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court and find that Marion/SITLA does not have authority under 
Subsection 501(6)(a) of the condemnation statute to take KFJ's land for roads in 
connection with their oil and gas deposits.23 
J
 If this Court should find the trial court's determination was in error - which KFJ 
strongly believes is not the case - automatic granting of Marion/SITLA's motion for 
summary judgment is inappropriate. In addition to opposing Marion/SITLA's motion for 
summary judgment, KFJ brought a Rule 56(f) motion requesting the opportunity to 
conduct additional discovery before a decision is made regarding Marion/SITLA's ability 
to condemn KFJ's land. (R.000167—R.000185) On determining the term "mineral" did 
not include oil and gas, the trial court denied Marion/SITLA's motion for summary 
judgment thus rendering KFJ's Rule 56(f) motion moot. (R.000216) Before a decision 
can be entered on Marion/SITLA's motion for summary judgment, KFJ's Rule 56(f) 
motion should be decided. 
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DATED: March j j , 2010. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
. homas K. Karrenberg 
Jon V. Harper 
Samantha J. Slark 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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VIII. ADDENDUM 
1. 1896 Utah Laws 316 
2. Utah Rev. Stat. § 3588(6) (1898) 
3. 1907 Utah Laws 143 
4. Utah Comp. Laws § 7330(6) (1917) 
5. 1963 Utah Laws 632 
6. 1969 Utah Laws 1004 
7. S. B. 156, 1997 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 1997) 
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LAWS OF UTAH. 
PASSED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE FIRST 
LEGISLATURE O F THE STATE O F 
UTAH, 1896. 
AN ACT to fix the t ime for the convening in regular session of the Firs t 
Legislature of the State of Utah. 
lie it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
That the first regular session of the Legislature Time of 
of the State of Utah shall commence on Tuesday the™$&°L 
serenth day of January A. D. 1896, at the hour of four 
o'clock p. m. of said day. 
This act shall take effect immediately. 
Approved January 7, 1896. 
316 L A W S OF U T A H . 
CHAPTER XCIV. 
T E R M I N A T I O N OF T H E FIRST SESSION OF T H E LEGIS-
L A T U R E . 
H. J. R. Resolution fixing the Termination of the First Session of the 
Legislature. 
Be it resolved and enacted by the Legislature of the State 
of Utah: 
That the first regular session of the Legislature of 
m^ hoidTseB- ^ e State of Utah expires by limitation of law on the 
aion on Sunday, fifth day of April, A. D. 1896, and that legislative ses-
sions may and should be held, and executive action up-
on pending measures had, upon said day to the same 
extent and with the same effect as though said day 
were not Sunday, and that this resolution shall take 
immediate effect. 
Approved April 4,1896. 
CHAPTER XOV. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
AN ACT to encourage the Irrigation of Land, the Mining, Milling, Smelting 
and other reduction of Ores, and the use and application of the Unappro-
priated Waters of Natural Streams and Water-courses to the Generation 
of Electrical Force and Energy, and to provide for the exercise of the 
right of Eminent Domain therefor. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
SECTION 1. The cultivation and irrigation of the ]Sd^t£inf s o ^ ' ^^e Pr°duction and reduction of ores, are of vital 
iSita^ mSSt. necessity to the people of the State of Utah; are pur-
ores, and suits in which all are interested and from which all de-
fiTctefc^pSwer rive a benefit; and the use and application of theunap-
a public use. propriated waters of the natural streams and water-
courses of the State to the generation of electrical force 
or energy to be employed in industrial pursuits are of 
great public benefit and utility. So irrigation of land, 
the mining, milling, smelting or other reduction of ores, 
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and such use and application of such waters for the 
generation of electrical power to be employed as afore-
said are hereby declared to be for the public use and the 
right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf ^ X f c 
thereof. 
Sec. 2. Any person, company or corporation which Ri&ht °f ™y-
may be prior to the commencement of the special pro-
ceedings in this act provided for, engaged in the irri-
gation of lands, or in mining, milling, smelting or other 
reduction of ores may acquire real estate or the r ight 
of way through the same, when necessary, or any right , 
title, interest, or estate or claim therein, which may 
be necessary, for the purposes of any such business; 
and any association, company or corporation which 
may be prior to the commencement of the special pro-
ceedings of this act provided for, formed or organized 
ior the purpose of using and applying any of the unap-
propriated waters of an}' natural stream or water-course 
m the State, to the generation of electrical force or 
energy, to be transmitted, sold, furnished and supplied 
to those who may desire to use such force or power or 
energy in any industrial pursuit, or for any useful or 
beneficial purpose, may acquire real estate or r ight of 
way through the same, when necessary, or any r ight , 
title, interest, or estate or claim therein, which may be 
necessary, for t h e purpose of any such business, by 
means of the special proceedings prescribed by this 
act. 
The said proceedings shall be substantially as fol- proceedings to 
i x J secure 
lows: 
There shall be filed in the clerk's office, of the dis- petition; 
trict court, in the county where the real estate is situ-contents-
ated, a petition verified according to law, stating there-
in the name of the person, company or corporation 
presenting the petition, that they are engaged in the 
business of irrigation., or of mining, milling, smelting, 
or other reduction of ores, as the case may be, or tha t 
they are formed or organized for the purpose of using 
and applying the unappropriated waters of some natur-
al stream or water-course in the State to the genera-
tion of electrical force or energy to be transmitted, 
sold, furnished, and supplied to those who may desire 
to use such force or energy in any industrial pursuit or 
for any useful or beneficial purpose; the description by 
metes and bounds, or by some accurate designation of 
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794 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
its full amount, and for the possession of the premises. In all other cases the 
judgment may be euforoed immediately. [C. L §§ 3801, 3802*. 
Cal C Civ P 11174«\ tiff in JV case for damages for foruble entry or un 
Treble damages ioi foruble entry, etc , I 3510 lawful detainer is entitled to recover treble da^* 
Undei sections 3787 and 3S01, C L 1BS8, a plain- ngcb Bodes v U P Goal Co., — U —, 48 P U8* 
3 5 8 5 . P l e a d i n g s verified The complaint and answer must be verified. 
[C. L. § 3802. 
Cal C Q T F §1175 
3586 . A p p e a l wi th in t en days . U n d e r t a k i n g . S tay . Either party 
may, -within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by 
the defendant shall not stay the execution of the judgment, unless, within said 
ten days, he shall execute aud fie with the court oi justice his undertaking to the 
plaintiff, with two oi more sureties, in au amount to be fixed by the court or 
justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount oi the judgment 
and costs, to the effect that, if the judgment appealed fioin be affirmed or the 
appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the costs of appeal 
the value of the use and occupation of the property, and damages justly accruing 
-DO the plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and 
filing the undertaking, all f urthei proceedings in the case shall be stayed. [Q 
L. § 3660*. 
CRI C CIV P 1976* 
3 5 8 7 . Oivil p rocedure appl icab le . The provisions oi this code, 
relative to civil actions, appeals, and new trials, so fax as they are not inconsist-
ent with the provisions of tins chapter apply to the proceedings mentioned m this 
chapter, [C. L. § 3804. 
Cal a Civ P 11177*. 
CHAPTER 65. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
3 5 8 8 . Exerc i sed in beha l f of w h a t uses . Subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the fol-
lowing public uses • 
1. All public uses authorized by the government of the United States. 
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other pub-
lic uses authorized by the legislature. 
3. Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, incorporated 
city or town, or school district; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditcher, or 
pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, or incorpo-
rated city or town, or for draining any county, or incorporated city or town, f01 
raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, 
deepening, or straightening their channels, for roads, streets, and alleyb, and all 
other public uses ior the benefit of any county, incorporated eity or town, or the 
inhabitants thereof 
4. "Wharves, docks piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, by-
roads, plank and turnpike loads, roads foi transportation by traction engines 01 
road locomotives, roads foi logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street 
railways foi public transportation 
5. Heservon*s, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tram els, aque-
ducts, and pipes foi supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other works for 
the reduction of ores, with water foi domestic 01 other uses, or foi irrigating pur-
poses, or for draining and reclaiming kinds, or foi floating logs and lumber on 
streams not navigable. 
6. Roads, railroads, i ram ways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dump-
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fag places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the 
working of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of 
tailings, refuse, or water from mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction, 
of ores, or from mines; mill dams; natural gas or oil pipe lines, tanks, or reser-" 
voirsj also an occupancy in ooinmon by the owners or possessors of different 
mines, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, of any place for 
the flow, deposit, or conduct of ta.ilingB or refuse matter. 
7. By-roads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
8. Telegraph, telephone, electric light, and electric power lines. 
9. Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten 
families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college or 
-university. 
10. Oanals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for sup-
plying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of 
generating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or heat. 
11. Cemeteries or public parks. [G. L. § 3841*; >90, p . 37; '92, pp. 42, 92 ; 
>96, p. 816. 
Cal. C. Crr. P . i 1238*. See Sup. '93, p. 995, and Under section 3B4L G. L. 1888, providing tha t 
Sup. '95, p. 33. ? 1233*.
 # tne right of eminent aomain may be exerciaed in 
Eminent domain for pipee, tanks, etc.., for nat- behalf of steam and horse railroads; held, that by 
uxal gas, 11552; foT rjght of vay for canals, ditches, implication this right may be exercised in behalf 
etc., # 1277, for railroads, I 436; for drainage dis- of eleoirical railways. Ogden City Bailway Com-
-fcrict, I 773. * pany v. Ogden City, 7 U. 207, 26 P. 288. 
3689. E s t a t e s a n d r i gh t s subjec t t o c o n d e m n a t i o n . The following 
is a classiiicatioxL of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public 
nse: 
1. A fee simple, when taken for pnblie buildings or grounds, or for perma-
nent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, 
or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a 
mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores. 
2. An easement, when taken for any other use. 
8. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right to take 
therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may be necessary for 
some public use, [G. L. § 3845*. 
Oal. a Crr. P . I 1239*. 
3590. Property subject to condemnation. The private property 
which may be taken under this chapter includes: 
1. A3! real property belonging to any person. 
2. X*and8 belonging to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city or 
town, not appropriated to some public use. 
3. Property appropriated to public uBej providedj t ha t such property shall 
not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which it has been 
already appropriated. 
4. Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferrieB, and all other franchises; 
provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unleBS for free highways, railroads, 
or other more necessary public use. 
5. All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in section thirty-
five hundred and eighty-eight, and any and all structures and improvements 
thereon, and the lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to 
be connected with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way or improve-
ment or structure thereon. They shall also be Bubject to a limited use in common 
with the owner thereof, when necessary; but such useB of crossings, intersections, 
-and connections shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest 
public benefit and the least private injury. 
6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public 
nse when such taking is authorized by law. [C. L. § 3843. 
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ated; the Board of County Commissioners shall appoint the members of 
the Board of Education, to serve until the next election provided for in 
this section, and until their successors are duly elected and qualified; 
provided, that -where there have been designated three trustees for the 
entire district, each one being from a school representative precinct, 
then these are constituted members of the Board of Education until the 
next election, and the Board of County Commissioners shall appoint 
two other members, one from each unrepresented representative pre-
cinct ; but where two or more trustees are from one school representa-
tive precinct, the Board of County Commissioners shall designate the 
member of the Board of Education. Members of the Board of Educa-
tion in a county school district of the first class shall qualify by taking 
and subscribing the constitutional oath of office, and giving bonds to 
the district in which, they reside in such sum and with such sureties as 
the Board of County Commissioners may require and approve, condi-
tioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of their office; the oath 
of office and bonds to be filed with the County Clerk. 
Approved this 14th day of March, 1907. 
CHAPTEB 114. 
EIGHTS OF EMINENT DOMAIN. 
An Act amending Section 3588 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as amended by 
Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1901, providing for the uses in which the right of emi-
nent domain may be exercised. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
SECTION 1. Section Amended. That {Section 3588 of Kevised 
Statutes of Utah., 1898, as amended by Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1901, 
be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: 
3588. Exercised in Befcalf of What Uses. Subject to the pro-
visions of Chapter 65, Revised Statutes, 1898, tlie Bight of Eminent Do-
main may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses: 
1. AH public uses authorized by the Government of the United 
States. 
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the State, and all 
other public uses authorized by the Legislature. 
3. Public buildings and grounds for the use of any County, incor-
porated City or Town, or School District; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, 
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flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhab-
itants of any County, or incorporated City or Town, or for draining any 
County, or incorporated City or Town; for raising the banks of streams, 
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straight-
ening their channels; for roads, streets, and alleys, and all other public 
uses for the benefit of any County, incorporated City or Town, or the 
inhabitants thereof. 
4. Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, 
by-roads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction 
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, 
and railroads and street railways for public transportation. 
5. Reservoirs, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, 
aqueducts, and pipes for supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or 
other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other 
uses, or for irrigating purposes, or for draining and reclaiming lands, or 
for floating logs and lumber on streams not navigable. 
6. Koads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of 
ores, or the working of mines, quarries or mineral deposits; outlets, nat-
ural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse, or 
water from mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction of ores, or 
from mines, quarries or mineral deposits; mill dams; natural gas or oil 
pipe lines, tanks, or reservoirs j also an occupancy in common by the 
owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, mineral deposits, 
mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, of any place 
for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter. 
7. By roads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
8. Telegraph, telephone, electric lights, and electric power lines, 
and sites for electric light and power plants. 
9. Sewerage of any city, or town, or of any settlement of not less 
than ten families, or of any public building belonging to the State, or 
of any college or university. 
10. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes 
for supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the 
purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or 
heat. 
11. Cemeteries or public parks. 
12. Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids 
connected with the manufacture of beet sugar. 
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sistent with the provisions of this chapter, apply to the proceedings mentioned 
in this chapter. 
Cal. C Civ. P . , § 1177* 
CHAPTER 65. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
7330. (3588.) Exercised in behalf of what uses. Subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercise-d in behalf 
of the following public uses: 
1. All public uses authorized by the government of the United States ; 
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other 
public uses authorized by the legislature; 
3. Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, incorporated 
city or town, or school district; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, 
or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, or 
incorporated city or town, or for draining any county, or incorporated city or 
town; for raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, 
and widening, deepening, or straightening their channels; for roads, streets, 
and alleys, and all other public uses for the benefit of any county, incorpo-
rated city or town, or the inhabitants thereof; 
4. Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, by-
roads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines 
or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads 
and street railways for public transportation; 
5. Reservoirs, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aque-
ducts, and pipes for the supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other 
works for the reduction of ores*with water for domestic or other uses, or for 
irrigation purposes, or for draining and reclaiming lands, or for floating logs 
and lumber on streams not navigable; 
6. Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dump-
ing places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the 
working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits; outlets, natural 
or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse, or water from 
mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction of ores; or from mines, quar-
ries, coal mines, or mineral deposits; mill dams; natural gas or oil pipe lines, 
tanks, or reservoirs; also any occupancy in common by the owners or posses-
sors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, 
or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit, or 
conduct of tailings or refuse mat ter ; 
7. By-roads leading from highways to residences and farms ; 
8. Telegraph, telephone, electric light, and electric power lines, and sites 
for electric light and power plants; 
9. Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than 
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college 
or university; 
10. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for 
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose 
of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or hea t ; 
11. Cemeteries or public parks; 
12. Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids con-
nected with the manufacture of beet sugar; 
13. For sites for mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction of 
ores and necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to 
take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes, and 
dust therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the 
powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county where 
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the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the limits of 
any incorporated city or town; nor unless the proposed condemnor has the 
right to operate by purchase, option to purchase, or easement, as to at least 
seventy-five per cent of the value of land acreage owned by persons or cor-
porations situated within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter, or 
other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of said four miles 
radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or agreements ex-
isting between the condemnor and the owner of land within said limit and 
providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the re-
duction of ores; rior until an action shall have been commenced to restrain the 
operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores 
Am' d '01, p. 19; '07, p. 143; '09, p . SO. 
(1893) p. Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1238*. See Sup, 
995, and Sup. (1895) p. 33, § 1233*. 
Eminent domain for pipes, tanks, e ta , for 
natural gas, § 4024; for right of way for canals, 
ditches, etc., § 3466; for railroads, for right of 
way and for water, § 1228, sub. 3; for drainage 
district, § 2046; for city, for water, § 570x2; ir-
rigation districts, § 3526; county hospital site, 
5 2781. 
Property and franchises of private corpora-
tions subject to eminent domain, Con. art. 12, 
sec. 11. 
Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation, 
Con. a r t 1, sec. 22, and note. 
No person shall be deprived of property with-
out due process of law, Con. art. 1 sec 7, and 
note. 
Condemnation by foreign corporation, § 946. 
Condemnation by state armory# § 2884. 
Con. art. 1, sec. 22, providing that private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation, is a 
limitation on exercise of power of eminent do-
main. 
Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 TJ. 368; 57 
P. 1. 
If the land on which shade trees adjacent to 
sidewalk stood was owned by the abutting 
property owner, the city could only cut the 
trees by condemning the land and upon paying just compensation. 
Giauque v. S. L. City, 42 TJ. 89; 129 P. 429, 
Wthere an owner of land on both sides of 
the highway acquired title to the highway by 
failure of the public to use and work it, she 
could not be compelled thereafter to allow 
it to be opened as a highway, without com-
pensation being made. 
Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 TJ. 501; 126 P. 959. 
RAILROADS: 
Under § 3841, C. L. 1888, providing that the 
right of eminent domain may be exercised in 
behalf of steam and horse railroads; held, that 
hy implication this right may be exercised in 
"behalf of electrical railways. 
Ogden City Bailway Company v. Ogden City, 
7 U. 207; 26 P. 288. 
Land which is a part of a railroad's right of 
way, but not used for any purpose and not 
essential to the enjoyment of such railroad's 
franchise and property, may be appropriated 
to the use of a duly incorporated telegraph 
company for the purpose of constructing and 
maintaining its lines, since such appropriation 
is for a more necessary public use. Measure of 
damages. 
Postal Tel. & C. Co. v, O. S. L. R. R. Co., 23 
TJ. 474; 65 P. 735 
A city council cannot authorize a permanent 
switch track, for a private business only, along 
a street and across a sidewalk, from a steam 
railroad in the street, to the detriment of peo-
ple residing on the street and to the damage 
of their abutting property; the streets being 
dedicated to public use. 
Cereghino v. O S. L. R. R. Co., 26 U. 467; 
73 P. 634. 
A party whose property is about to be dam-
aged in a substantial degree for public use is 
given same remedies as would be accorded him 
if his property were actually appropriated for 
public use. 
Stockdale v. R. G. W. Ry. Co., 28 TJ, 201; 77 
P . 849. 
Pallroad cannot subject private property in 
a city to burdens to which it will be subjected 
by running of cars and engines over a switch 
laid over adjoining property, without proceed-
ing under law of eminent domain. 
Id. 
CANALS, MINES, ETC.: 
The provision of this section and §§ 7332 
7338, render, under ordinary circumstances' 
property appropriated for a public use liable to 
condemnation for another public use. 
Salt Lake City v. Water & EL P. Co., 24 TJ 
249; 67 P. 672. 
A proceeding by a power company under the 
eminent domain statute to obtain the right to 
connect a flume with a city's canal for purpose 
of discharging water into it, under the pro-
visions of this section and § 7332, is not a suit 
to condemn land belonging to the city, and it 
is not necessary to show, as provided in § 7333, 
that the use to which it is to be applied by 
power company is a more necessary public use 
than that to which the city devotes it. (On 
rehearing, 25 U. 456; 71 P . 1069.) 
Salt Lake City v. Water & El. P. Co., 24 U. 
249; 67 P . 672. 
Property is taken for a public use, within 
the provision of the constitution declaring that 
private, property shall not be taken for public 
use witiiout just compensation, when the tak-
ing is for use tha t will promote the public 
interest, and will tend to develop the resources 
of the state. In this case a right of way for 
an irrigation ditch. 
Nash v. Clark, 27 TJ. 158; 75 P. 371; affirmed 
198 U. S. 361. 
The construction and operation of roads and 
tramways for the development and working 
of mines is a public use. 
Highland B. G. M. Co. v. Strtckley, 28 U. 215; 
78 P . 296; affirmed 200 U. S. 525. 
Where a street grade was established but 
not carried into effect, and thereafter buildings 
were erected, the city was liable for damages 
resulting from the chang-e of grade. The fact 
that the improvements were made before the 
adoption of Con. art. 1, sec. 22, does not relieve 
liability. 
Kimball v. S. L. City, 32 U. 253; 90 P. 395. 
Hempstead v. S. L. City, 32 TJ. 261; 90 P . 397. 
Felt v. S. L. City, 32 TJ. 275; 90 P . 402. 
Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 U. 221; 120 P. 
Lannan v. Waltenspiel, 45 TJ. 564; 147 P. 908. 
A proceeding under § 3467 to obtain lihe right 
to enlarge an irrigation canal of another is 
controlled by the principles involved in the 
exercise of the right of eminent domain. 
S. L. City v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 40 TJ. 126; 
121 P. 593. 
The right to use a reservoir in common may 
be condemned. . 
Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison High. Canal 
Co., 51 TJ. —; 174 P . 852. 
The rigiht to run water through defendants 
Irrigation canal may be condemned, tfcougn the 
defendant has only an easement and the own-
ers of the land were not parties. 
Whiterocks Irr. Co. v. Mooseman, 45 TJ. 79; 
141 P. 459. 
A purchaser of property on a city street does 
so with the implied consent that the street 
must be made reasonably safe and convenient 
for travel, and cannot complain if it is lowered 
or filled to make it safe for travel so long as 
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theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to 
take acknowledgments, released his or her or their control or custody 
of such child to any agency licensed to receive children for placement 
or adoption under Chapter 8 of Title 55, and such agency consents, in 
writing, to such adoption. 
A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of 
such parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release, 
such parent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8, 
Title 55; and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and 
have the same force and effect as a consent or release executed by an 
adult parent. A minor parent, having so executed a release or consent, 
cannot revoke the same upon such parent's attaining the age of majority. 
Approved March 15, 1963. 
CHAPTER 193 
S. B. No. 155. (Passed March 14, 1963. In effect May 14, 1963.) 
COAL PIPE LINE EMINENT DOMAIN 
An Act Amending Section 78-34-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
Amended by Chapter 174, Laws of Utah 1957, Relating to Eminent 
Domain; Providing for Eminent Domain Regarding Coal Pipe Lines. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 78-34-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 
174, Laws of Utah 1957, is amended to read: 
78-34-1. Uses for Which Right May be Exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain 
may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses; 
(1) All public uses authorized by the government of the United States. 
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all 
other public uses authorized by the Legislature. 
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or 
incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, 
flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the in-
habitants of any county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining 
of any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of 
streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deeping or 
straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other 
public uses for the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or 
the inhabitants thereof. 
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, 
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction 
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, 
and railroads and street railways for public transportation. 
(5) Reservoirs, dams, water gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, 
aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters 
or other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or 
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other uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming 
of lands; or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable. 
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of 
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits; 
outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, 
refuse or water from mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of 
ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits; mill dams; 
gas, oil or coal pipe lines, tanks or reservoirs; also any occupancy in 
common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal 
mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction 
of ores, or any place for the flow,* deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse 
matter. 
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and 
sites for electric light and power plants. 
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less 
than ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or 
of any college or university. 
(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes 
for supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the 
purpose of generating and transmitting electrieit}^ for power, light or 
heat. 
(11) Cemeteries and public parks. 
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids 
connected with the manufacture of beet sugar. 
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of 
ores and necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the 
right to take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, 
fumes and dust therefrom, produced by the operation of such work; 
provided that the powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exer-
cised in any county where the population exceeds twenty thousand, or 
within one mile of the limits of any city or incorporated town; nor 
unless the proposed condemner has the right to operate by purchase, 
option to purchase or easement, at least seventy-five per cent in value 
of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated within a 
radius of four miles from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduc-
tion of ores; nor beyond the limits of said four-mile radius; nor as to 
lands covered by contracts, easements or agreements existing between 
the condemner and the owner of land within said limit and providing 
for the operation of such mill, smelter or other works for the reduction 
of ores; nor until an action shall have been commenced to restrain the 
operation of such mill, smelter QY other works for the reduction of ores. 
(14) Buildings, grounds, lands and rights of way for use of private 
educational institutions of collegiate grade within the State of Utah 
which are not conducted for profit and which admit all students of tHe 
state meeting the academic and moral standards of such educational 
institutions. 
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Section 1. Section Enacted. 
Section 78-25-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 
46, Laws of Utah 1955, is amended to read as follows: 
78-25-21. Admissibility of results in evidence. 
The results of the tests shall be received in evidence where the conclu-
sion of all examiners, as disclosed by the tests, is that the alleged father 
is not the actual father of the child, and the question of paternity shall be 
so resolved. If the examiners disagree in their findings or conclusions, the 
question shall be submitted to a jury duly impanelled. If the examiners 
conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father's 
paternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion of the court, 
depending upon the infrequency of the blood type. 
Approved February 18, 1969. 
CHAPTER 258 
S. B. No. 59 (Passed February 13, 1969. In effect May 13, 1969) 
EMINENT DOMAIN FOR MINERALS IN SOLUTION 
An Act Amending Sections 78-34-1 and 78-34-2, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as Amended by Chapter 174, Laws of Utah 1957, and Chapter 
193, Laws of Utah 1963, Relating to Eminent Domain, Providing for 
Eminent Domain for Solar Evaporation Ponds and Other Facilities 
for the Recovery of Minerals in Solution. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 78-34-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 
174, Laws of Utah 1957, and Chapter 193, Laws of Utah 1963, is amended 
to read: 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain 
may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses; 
(1) All public uses authorized by the government of the United 
States. 
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all 
other public uses authorized by the legislature. 
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or 
incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, 
flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the in-
habitants of any county or city or incorporated town, or, for the draining 
of any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of 
streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or 
straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other 
public uses for the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or 
the inhabitants thereof. 
(4) Wharves, docks, piers chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, 
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction 
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and 
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railroads and street railways for public transportation. 
(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, 
aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters 
or other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other 
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of 
lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, 
or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of 
minerals in solution. 
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction 
of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or minerals deposits 
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the de-
posit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other 
works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or 
mineral deposits including minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or 
coal pipe lines, tanks or reservoirs; solar evaporation ponds and other 
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in 
common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal 
mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction 
of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse 
matter. 
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and 
sites for electric light and power plants. 
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less 
than ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of 
any college or university. 
(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes 
for supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the 
purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat. 
(11) Cemeteries and public parks. 
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids 
connected with the manufacture of beet sugar. 
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of 
ores and necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right 
to take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes 
and dust therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, 
that the powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any 
county where the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one 
mile of the limits of any city or incorporated town; nor unless the pro-
posed condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to pur-
chase or easement, at least seventy-five per cent in value of land acreage 
owned by persons or corporations situated within a radius of four miles 
from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor be-
yond the limits of said four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by con-
tracts, easements or agreements existing between the condemner and the 
owner of land within said limit and providing for the operation of such 
mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action 
shall have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter 
or other works for the reduction of ores. 
(14) Buildings, grounds, lands and rights of way for use of private 
educational institutions of collegiate grade within the State of Utah 
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which are not conducted for profit and which admit all students of the 
state meeting the academic and moral standards of such educational in-
stitutions. 
Section 78-34-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read: 
78-34-2. Estates and rights that may be taken. 
The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands sub-
ject to be taken for public use: 
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for 
permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding 
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit 
of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduc-
tion of ores, or for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the 
recovery of minerals in solution; provided that where surface ground is 
underlaid with minerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to 
justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the 
surface ground over such deposits. 
(2) An easement, when taken for any other use. 
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation of lands, with the 
right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as 
may be necessary for some public use. 
Approved March 3,1969. 
CHAPTER 259 
H. B. No. 276 (Passed March 13, 1969. In effect May 13, 1969) 
COURT ADMINISTRATOR TO APPOINT REPORTERS 
An Act Requiring the Court Administrator to Appoint Certified Short-
hand Reporters, Providing for their Tenure of Office Repealing Sect-
ion 78-56-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Court administrator to appoint certified shorthand reporters 
—District judge to approve. 
The court administrator shall appoint a certified shorthand reporter 
with the approval of the district judge to report the proceedings in each 
division of the district courts. The certified shorthand reporter shall 
hold office during the pleasure of the court administrator, and the district 
judge. 
Section 2. Section repealed. 
Section 78-56-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is hereby repealed. 
Approved March 19, 1969. 
CHAPTER 260 
H. B No. 103 (Passed February 14, 1969. In effect May 13, 1969) 
COURT REPORTER FEES 
An Act Amending Section 78-56-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
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